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Illicit drugs can travel across multiple borders before reaching their 
intended retail market. International drug trafficking is important because it 
introduces a large quantity of foreign sourced illicit drugs into domestic drug 
markets. Of utmost importance are countries that lie along the transshipment 
paths used by international drug trafficking operations that facilitate the 
movement of illicit drugs. Understanding the characteristics of countries 
operating as transit states is necessary to combat transshipment operations. The 
study investigates social, economic, geographic, and political factors that have 
the potential to account for nations being positioned as transit states in illicit drug 
transshipment networks generated from the United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime Individual Drug Seizures data set. Quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) 
regression models reveal that border connectivity is the most significant 
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International drug trafficking is a type of transnational organized crime in 
which groups and individuals operate to facilitate the global movement of illicit 
drugs. More formally, the United States National Security Council (2011) defines 
transnational organized crime as involving groups or individuals who—operate 
across national borders, are driven by monetary gain, conduct their activities 
often by illegal means, seek to influence institutional structures in which they 
operate, and exploit differences between countries to do their bidding. The 
profitability associated with international drug trafficking continues to draw 
individuals, making it the second most lucrative illicit market (Global Financial 
Integrity, 2017).  
Global Financial Integrity estimates in their Transnational Crime and the 
Developing World (2017) report that the illicit drug market is worth between $426 
billion to $652 billion US dollars. The demand for product drives the market, 
securing future profits as buyers and users become dependent. Since 2009, 
there has been a 30% increase in consumption rates of illicit drugs worldwide 
(World Drug Report, 2019). According to the United Nations World Drug Report 
(2019), an estimated 271 million individuals worldwide used some form of illicit 
drug in 2017. The consequences of illicit drug use are significant. For instance, 
more than half a million individuals between the ages of 15 to 64 died in 2017 
from illicit drug use (World Drug Report, 2017). 
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International drug trafficking operations are structurally different from 
domestic operations in terms of functionality and operation (Reuter, 2014; 
Swanstorm, 2007). While the transshipment of illicit drugs is a considerably small 
component of the illicit drug market commodity-chain as a whole, it is a critical 
link in understanding the flow of illicit drugs (Malm & Bichler, 2011). Specifically, 
it is important to observe the role of countries (international level actors) 
embedded across transshipment operations as they facilitate the movement of 
illicit drugs. In this study, countries involved in the transshipment of illicit drugs 
will be referred to as transit states.  
A transit state is operationalized as a country that enables the movement 
of illicit drugs across national and international borders (knowingly or not). 
Designated transit states act as a bridge between any two given countries, 
influencing the flow of illicit drugs. Understanding the markers associated with 
countries operating as transit states will enable researchers and practitioners to 
predict and identify areas of weakness along transshipment operations, and 
supports the development of proactive policies.  
Outline 
This thesis includes four additional chapters. Chapter two reviews the 
academic literature concerning the transshipment of illicit drugs. Then, transit 
states are described, and their importance highlighted. The theoretical 
frameworks applied to the study of transshipment operations are also reviewed. 
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Next, the role transit states play in facilitating the movement of illicit drugs is 
explained. Lastly, the characteristics of transit states are debated.  
Chapter three explains the methodology. The chapter begins by providing 
a brief overview of the research design. Network generation is then described, as 
is the primary data source for the study. Next, I discuss attribute variables and 
explain how the dependent variable was classed using three network centrality 
measures. The chapter ends by discussing the analytic plan. 
Chapter four describes the results obtained during the analyses. First, 
network descriptors are provided for networks generated, and then, countries 
designated as transit states are identified. Lastly, I present findings from 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) regression models.  
Chapter five discusses the study’s main findings in relation to the 
hypotheses made at the beginning of the study. Then, potential policy 
implications are presented and discussed briefly. Next, I present limitations 
relating to the scope of the study as a whole. The chapter ends with a discussion 






Transshipment of Illicit Drugs 
The most recent global estimates show that roughly 271 million people 
reported having used some type of illicit drug in a single year (World Drug 
Report, 2019). Of that, 11 million individuals reported having injected illicit drugs, 
from which 1.4 million reported having HIV, 5.6 million reported having Hepatitis 
C, and 1.2 million reported having both (World Drug Report, 2019). While 
medical costs associated with drug use and collateral disease transmission are 
significant, these estimates underrepresent the scope of the problem—of those 
who suffer from drug-related disorders, only about one in seven are able to 
receive treatment (World Drug Report, 2019). Moreover, the detrimental cost 
associated with the production, transshipment, and distribution of illicit drugs 
goes beyond financial burdens (Enderwick, 2016). Drug markets pose significant 
social and health issues at both the individual and community level, aggravating 
problems already affecting the nations involved (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; 
Enderwick, 2016; Bybee, 2012; Swanstorm, 2007).  
Moving illicit products along the international drug market commodity-
chain requires different activities (Malm & Bichler, 2011). To understand how 
product flows into retail markets, it is necessary to investigate what factors 
contribute to the success of transshipment operations. The transshipment of illicit 
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drugs is the process in which illicit drugs ship to an intermediary destination, 
before reaching their final destination. The intermediary destinations used for the 
transshipment of illicit drugs are referred to as transit states.   
Transit States – What are They? 
Transit states positioned within a network of international drug trafficking 
routes are key points that enable the transshipment of illicit drugs to cross 
borders and move between nations (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Trumbore & Woo, 
2014). Without the fluidity of international movement, the perceived risk-to-benefit 
ratios associated with smuggling operations would decline significantly 
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 
2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011).  
Porous borders improve risk-to-benefit ratios by limiting exposure to legal 
barriers and maximizing profitability. When porous border controls interact with 
weak political and security systems, illicit drug problems can contribute to 
increased regional and global scale security threats (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; 
Sands, 2007; Swanstorm, 2007). Studies find that transit states are likely to 
suffer from institutional fragmentation and instability (Bybee, 2012, Maftei, 2012; 
Miraglia et al., 2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011; Sands, 2007; Emmers, 2003). Since 
involvement in the transshipment of illicit drugs is not always voluntary—at times 
couriers are coerced to participate (Caulkins, 2009; Sands, 2007)—drug related 
activities could exacerbate public safety concerns already prevalent in unstable 
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social systems. Studies also show potential links between illicit drug 
transshipment operations and terrorist groups established in transit states, further 
raising security threats in and around that region (Ekici & Coban, 2014; Wyler & 
Cook, 2011).   
Theoretical Frameworks 
It is important to note that there is no established theoretical framework to 
explain international drug trafficking fully. Combining two perspectives—the small 
world perspective and the price risk model—it is possible to develop an 
integrated explanation for the structural position of states within the network of 
transnational illicit drug distribution. 
Small Worlds Perspective 
The small world perspective stems from a set of experiments conducted 
by Milgram (1967), in which he observed how likely it was that two random 
individuals from the same community of actors could be connected to one 
another. Focusing on societal network structures, Milgram (1967) notes how two 
individuals can be connected back to each other indirectly via six acquaintances 
at most. The Milgram (1967) study emphasizes the role of intermediaries in 
observed networks, identifying the critical function played by hubs and bridges in 
generating structural features that foster social integration. 
In the small world perspective, hubs are actors with many direct ties, and 
often these highly connected individual’s link to other hubs. Bridges are central 
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actors, whose positioning connects other actors that otherwise would not be 
connected. As societal networks evolve, a process of self-organization occurs 
wherein structures continue to develop, i.e., over time highly central actors, such 
as hubs, will link to other hubs. Relating the small world perspective to this study, 
a transit state is an actor that is central to the transshipment of illicit drugs. In 
applying the logic behind the small world’s perspective to this study, countries 
are only designated transit states if they are central to the network they are in. 
The central positioning of actors is theoretically linked to centrality metrics. 
Prior research that incorporated the use of network analyses has used numerous 
centrality metrics to identify key individuals, countries, paths, and factors believed 
to facilitate the movements of illicit drugs (Berlusconi, Aziani, & Giommoni, 2017; 
Giommoni, Aziani, & Berlusconi, 2017; Boivin, 2014). The incorporation of more 
than one centrality metric allows for the robust identification of critical actors in 
any given network.  
Drawing upon network science provides investigative techniques that can 
be applied to relationships observed between individuals and organizations, even 
physical spaces. Concerned with the interrelatedness of social units and how 
they influence one another, this discipline offers metrics to observe individual 
actors in relation to others, and the overall operating structure (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). Here, social actors are countries, and intended drug shipments 
constitute the ties connecting nations. If centrality metrics can be used to identify 
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critical actors in any given network, then these metrics could be used to identify 
transit states critical to international drug trafficking networks. 
Prices and Risk Model 
In 1989, Reuter and Kleiman proposed a risk and price model to analyze 
international drug trafficking. The model assumes that individuals involved in the 
illicit transnational drug trade are rational actors who intentionally select a transit 
states (Giommoni, Aziani, & Berlusconi, 2017; Boivin, 2014; Reuter, 2014). 
Reuter and Klein (1989) argue that choice structuring factors relating to risk and 
price lead illicit drug operations to channel shipments through countries where 
risk of seizure is low, resulting in higher profits. According to this model, illicit 
drug transshipment operations are driven by factors that mediate risk and 
increase profit for those involved (Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). It follows, that efforts 
to combat international drug trafficking require identification of transit states using 
characteristics that represent price maximization and risk minimization (Boivin, 
2014; Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). 
Characteristics of Transit States 
Academic literature acknowledges that transit states embedded in illicit 
drug transshipment operations possess similar characteristics (Berlusconi et al., 
2017; Boivin, 2013; Bybee, 2012; Maftei, 2012; Miraglia et al., 2012; Toktas & 
Selimoglu, 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; Sands, 2007; Morselli & Giguere, 2006). Four 
types of factors are believed to facilitate the use of a country as a transit state for 
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transshipment operations: social, economic, geographic, and political factors 
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Boivin, 2013, 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Bybee, 
2012; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011; Ellis, 2009; Sands, 2007). 
Social Factors 
Social factors observed to influence transshipment operations relate to 
how close one country is to another based on socially construed ties, a concept 
known as social proximity (Giommoni et al., 2017). Social proximity is crucial as it 
facilitates the use of a country as a transit state in transshipment by creating 
relational ties between individuals located in drug-producing countries and 
potential transit states. Academic literature notes that countries with higher levels 
of social proximity to drug producing countries are more likely to be used as 
transit states (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et al., 2017; Trumbore & Woo, 
2014; Bybee, 2012; Miraglia et al., 2012; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012). In addition 
to influencing the direction of drug flow across transshipment operations, social 
proximity influences the frequency at which illicit drugs are trafficked (Berlusconi 
et al., 2017). 
Several indicators may be indicative of social proximity and can be used to 
observe the social proximity between any two countries; such as migration 
patterns, the presence of ethnic enclaves, and even rates at which a non-native 
language is spoken (Leuprecht et al., 2016; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 
2011). Social proximity facilitates the use of a country as a transit state across 
transshipment operations as it enables individuals to connect with others whom 
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they share some sort of tie stemming from socio-cultural construed relationships 
(Leuprecht et al., 2016; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 2011, Caulkins, 2009; 
Heber, 2009; Morselli & Giguere, 2006).  
The likelihood of a country to be a transit state increases with 
corresponding increases in migrant populations.  Heavy migration flow from a 
drug-producing country to a non-drug-producing country serves as a predictor for 
whether that country becomes a transit state (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni 
et al., 2017; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sands, 2007). Examples in which heavy 
migrant flow and relating factors was seen to facilitate the transshipment of illicit 
drugs is observed in countries like Tajikistan, El Salvador, Kenya, Turkey, and 
Spain (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Ekici & Coban, 2014; Giommoni et al., 2017; 
Miraglia et al., 2012; Sands, 2007).  
Spain, for example, attracts migrants from Latin America, as the native 
language in both is similar. This, in turn, has facilitated that Spain be used as a 
transit state across transshipment operations originating primarily in Columbia, 
with the goal of the product making its way to other European countries (Sands, 
2007). A study conducted by Ekici and Coban (2014) on the Afghan to Turkey 
heroin trade also found that dual citizenship, in particular, makes individuals 
more likely to be targeted for couriers across transshipment operations, as they 
will face fewer barriers to entry (Giommoni et al., 2017).  
Research shows that the greater the size of a migrant population or ethnic 
enclave residing in a non-drug-producing country from a drug-producing country, 
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the more likely that country is used as a transit state (Heber, 2009; Sands, 2007). 
Shared ethnic or cultural ties allow individuals heading transshipment operations 
to secure passage for their illicit product, willingly or not, due to social ties 
(Heber, 2009; Sands, 2007; Enderwick, 2006; Morselli & Giguere, 2006). Migrant 
communities are often not trusting of legal institutions, leaving individuals 
vulnerable to coercion by drug traffickers, who force individuals to participate in 
drug trafficking operations (Sands, 2007).  
Economic Conditions  
Economic conditions observed to influence transshipment operations 
relate to economic development and profit maximization for those involved in the 
illicit activity (Berlusconi et al., 2017). Countries that lack robust economies, 
meaning they are economically unstable and little is done by institutional factors 
to better it, are more likely to serve as transit states (Bybee, 2012; Maftei, 2012; 
Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Sands, 2007). Countries with unstable economies are 
observed to emerge and remain as transit states across transshipment 
operations; this has been the case with Turkey as well as the Central Asia region 
(Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Emmers, 2003). Countries suffering from economic 
instability often have high poverty; being that the legal economy is limited, 
individuals often turn to alternative avenues like drug trafficking (Bybee, 2012; 
Miraglia et al., 2012). Similar observations have occurred across the region of 
Africa, where many national economies are characterized as being rather weak, 
poor, and oppressed (Bybee, 2012; Ellis, 2009).  
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In countries characterized as economically unstable, drug trafficking is 
viewed as a means to provide for oneself and their family (Ellis, 2009). Similarly, 
countries like Turkey and those in Africa still operate as transit states since 
institutional structures allow drug traffickers to reap higher profit. Due to risk 
minimization in these regions being inexpensive, those who head the 
transshipment operations are able to sell at a higher wholesale rate (Toktas & 
Selimoglu, 2012; Bybee, 2012; Ellis, 2009). Profit maximization at the wholesale 
level is indicative of a reduced cost of risk in a given country and fewer structural 
barriers (Boivin, 2014). Countries that operate as transit states minimize costs 
faced by traffickers relating to risk; therefore they tend to have lower drug price 
mark-up values (Giommoni et al., 2017).  
Geographic Proximity 
Geographic proximity, meaning how close one country is to another based 
on geographic features, has been observed to facilitate the use of a country as a 
transit state (Giommoni, Aziani, Berlusconi, 2017). Geographic proximity—
geographic distance between nations, border connectivity, the size of a 
region/country, and geographic positional importance—creates relational ties 
between drug-producing countries and those geographically close to them, 
because of who that country is connected to (Giommoni et al., 2017; Sands, 
2007). 
The most basic measurement of geographic proximity is geographic 
distance, such as the Euclidian distance between central points within two 
13 
 
countries. Distance can be measured between a drug-producing country and a 
transit state, or between a transit state and a retailing country (Maftei, 2013; 
Sabatelle, 2011). Border connectivity relates to the number of borders a given 
country shares with other countries, increasing geographic proximity as it has 
more options for connectivity (Boivin, 2014; Maftei, 2012). The size of a region 
can also relate to geographic proximity as it enables drug trafficking operations to 
reach their intended destination without having to cross more than one 
international border (Maftei, 2012). Positional importance relates to how 
geographically close a country is to a traditional trafficking route or important 
region entryway (Maftei, 2012). Traditional trafficking routes like the Balkan 
Route and the Northern Route are able to provide a blanket of security for 
international drug trafficking operations due to their territorial features (De 
Danieli, 2014; Sabatelle, 2011). Therefore, countries that are geographically 
close to them become targets to operate as transit states to gain point of entry 
(Sabatelle, 2011).  
Research observes countries like Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and Iran to 
operate as transit states across transshipment operations because they serve as 
entry points for other European countries with higher barriers to entry (Ekici & 
Coban, 2013; Calderoni, 2012; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Layne, Khruppa, & 
Muzyka, 2011). The region of Africa often serves as a transit state for illicit drugs 
traveling from South America with the intent of making it to various European 
countries and North America (Wyler & Cook, 2011). The country of Tajikistan is 
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often used as a transit state for its geographic proximity to what is known as the 
Northern Route (Reuter, 2014; Miraglia, Ochoa, Briscoe, 2012). Located right in 
the middle of the established trafficking route, the country of Tajikistan operates 
as a known transit state for the transshipment of heroin from Central Asia due to 
its geographic proximity to the drug-producing region (Reuter, 2014; Miraglia, 
Ochoa, Briscoe, 2012). 
Across the literature, findings are not conclusive when assessing the 
importance of geographic proximity. Some researchers (Berlusconi et al., 2017; 
Giommoni et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Wyler & 
Cook, 2011) agree that geographic proximity is important in whether a country is 
used as transit state, while others argue that geographic proximity can easily be 
overlooked and therefore its’ influence is minimal given advances in transnational 
logistics (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Ekici & Ozbay, 2013). Geographic proximity 
appears to play less of role when risk is too high, and social proximity is rather 
low (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013; Sands, 2007). The availability of non-land modes of 
transportation like international flights reduces the importance of geographic 
proximity as well (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013). Nonetheless, literature does support the 
influence of geographic proximity, simply by varying degrees across observed 
drug trafficking operations. 
Political Factors 
Political factors observed to influence transshipment operations relate to 
the inability of a country to maintain order or to uphold the law within its borders, 
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a concept known as weak governance (Bybee, 2012). A country characterized by 
weak governance lacks the institutional and structural powers to combat illicit 
activity, like the transshipment of illicit drugs (Sands, 2007). Additionally, 
countries characterized by weak governance functioning as transit states tend to 
view the transshipment of illicit drugs more favorably (Ellis, 2009). 
A country characterized as having weak governance is likely to have 
inefficient forms of law enforcement, or perceived as corrupt (Toktas & 
Selimoglu, 2012; Ellis, 2009; Sands, 2007). Turkey for example, lacks efficient 
border controls, as a result, often used as a transit state due to the limited 
capabilities of the institutional system itself (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012). Literature 
supports that countries with weak governance are more likely to become transit 
states; however, the relationship is nonlinear (Giommoni et al., 2017). Meaning 
that weak governance within a transit state is preferred; however, countries 
characterized as having extremely weak governances are not ideal (Layne et al., 
2001). Countries in which drug traffickers feel they have a stronger hold than the 
country itself are more likely to become a transit state, as lower levels of risk are 
perceived (Trumbore & woo, 2014). The longer that a country allows itself to 
operate as a transit state, the more embedded it becomes across transshipment 
operations (Ellis, 2009).  
Corruption plays into risk minimization as it ensures that the illicit goods 
will make it across national borders for profit (Leuprecht et al., 2014). Across the 
literature, every country that has been observed as a transit state within 
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international drug trafficking operations is to some degree perceived as corrupt 
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2016; Boivin, 2014; De Danieli, 2014; 
Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; Wyler & Cook, 
2011; Emmers, 2003; Layne et al., 2001; Sands, 2007; Swanstorm, 2007). 
Literature acknowledges that countries with higher levels of perceived corruption 
are more likely to become transit states, as drug-producing countries are better 
able to minimize risk within their borders. (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et 
al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Bybee, 2012; Wyler & 
Cook, 2011). 
Trumbore and Woo (2014) identified that worldwide, politically stable 
countries where corruption can take place are more likely to become transit 
states. Spain is a clear example where the country is politically stable, yet 
corruption is present and thus used as a transit state (Calderoni, 2012; Sands, 
2007). Corruption has been observed to heighten the effects of all social and 
geographic factors in relation to whether a state will become a transit state, 
making it the most relevant factor (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2016; 
Boivin, 2014; De Danieli, 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia et al., 2012); 
Sabatelle, 2011; Wyler & Cook, 2011; Emmers, 2003; Layne et al., 2001; Sands, 
2007; Swanstorm, 2007). Coinciding with Boivin (2013), the current study argues 
that the combination of the factors mentioned throughout rather than individually 




Internal and external factors that facilitate the use of a country for illicit 
drug transshipment operations as a transit state warrant scholarly attention. It is 
evident that illicit drug trafficking as a whole is a risky business, and despite the 
policies meant to curb the illicit activity, its lucrative nature continues to attract 
individuals. For every seizure made in a country known to operate as a transit 
state, many more go unnoticed (Caulkins, 2009). Understanding what facilitates 
the use of a country as a transit state for transshipment operations is important 
because identifying specific factors provides direction for interdiction and crime 
prevention efforts at two socio-political levels—national and international. 
Limited research investigates the attributes of countries positioned as 
transshipment points in the transnational flow of illicit drugs. The majority of 
research available focuses on a specific country, region, or drug type, limiting the 
scope of the problem. For that reason, this study seeks to observe the 
transshipment of illicit drugs by aggregating all data available into one network 
for the selected observation period. Doing so generates a more comprehensive 
understanding of transit states. The study aims to highlight which factors are 
more highly correlated with transshipment positioning across illicit drug trade 
networks. The primary goal of this study is to identify what factors are more 
predictive of being a transit state within transnational illicit drug flow based on 
characteristics commonly referenced in academic literature to be facilitators. 
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Thinking about the transnational illicit drug trade as a network of countries, 
linked by the flow of drugs, it is possible to identify key transshipment nations. 
Extrapolating from the small world perspective, central countries operate as 
critical bridges linking networks, as such, transit states should be those most 
central countries in the illicit drug trafficking networks. Since drug traffickers 
decide where to route drug shipments, Reuter and Kleiman (1989) assert that the 
transshipment countries selected should exhibit characteristics that are most 
likely to minimize risks and maximize profit. Four factors are associated with 
transshipment countries—social connectivity among countries measured with 
migrant population, geographic proximity captured as border connectivity, 
economic benefit as indicated by drug-price mark-ups, and political climate—as 
reflected by the perceived level of and control of corruption. The following six 
hypotheses emerge from the literature: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of corruption in a country, the more 
likely it is to be a transit state. 
Hypothesis 2: Transit states have more border connectivity in comparison 
to countries that are not transit states. 
Hypothesis 3: Transit states have larger migrant population percentages in 
comparison to countries that are not transit states. 
Hypothesis 4: Transit states have lower drug price mark-up percentages in 
comparison to countries that are not transit states. 
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Hypothesis 5: Corruption is the most significant identifying marker of 
transit state designation. 
Hypothesis 6: The same countries are positioned as transit states within 
the illicit drug transshipment network irrespective of illicit drug 






This chapter describes the various components of the study. This 
investigation used a non-experimental cross-sectional design to identify which 
factors best explain the positional attributes of transit states situated within 
country-to-country transshipment networks. Six years of seizure data were 
aggregated to map the international drug flow and to identify countries operating 
as transit states. Using centrality metrics, transit states were identified as those 
best positioned in the network to serve as hubs or bridges along transshipment 
paths. Aggregated data can obscure drug-specific patterns; therefore, cocaine 
only and heroin trafficking networks were compared. Descriptive and multivariate 
analyses are run for each network. 
Primary Data Source and Network Generation  
Transshipment networks were generated from the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Individual Drug Seizure Cases data set. The UNODC 
is a division of the United Nations that gathers data on drugs and crime at an 
international level. The data set records the location of seizures that took place 
from 2013 to 2016. The report also includes data on the region, sub-region, 
country, administrative division, place, and date a drug seizure occurred. Also 
reported is the drug type, amount, unit packed in, how and where it was hidden, 
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and how it was transported. Where the drug was produced, where it was sent 
from, where it was meant to arrive, and the route used are also reported. 
Seizure data was used to generate three networks. The aggregated drug 
network (network one) represents all and any reported drug seizures that took 
place from 2013 to 2016 — the additional two networks record seizures involving 
cocaine only (cocaine network) and heroin only (heroin network) derivatives. 
Drug specific networks permit the identification of differences, if any, to be 
observed among countries serving as transit states due to the type of product 
being handled.  
All networks were single-mode and directed. Actors (nodes) represent 
countries reported to have seized illicit drugs, and ties (directed arcs) connect 
origin and destination countries involved in the seizure. Thus, the drug trafficking 
networks map country-to-country links, by connecting the country from which a 
drug ships and the country where the seizure of drug shipment occurred. A tie 
exists only when the location of the departure country and the receiving country 
was specified (refer to Figure 1 for a snapshot of IDS data set). Since 
connectivity was based on relational events, drug seizures, the network 





Figure 1.  Individual Drug Seizure Data Set Snapshot.  
 
 
The most significant limitations affecting the comprehensiveness of this 
data set are (1) that agencies report on a voluntary basis, and (2) that illicit drugs 
pass through borders undetected. The capacity and willingness of countries to 
detect international illicit drug shipments and report on drug seizures may be a 
byproduct of several factors—e.g., border control resources, political stability, 
and drug control policy. Consequently, the full scope of the transnational illicit 
drug trade is not known. Nonetheless, prior studies have relied on UNODC data 
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et al., 2017; Boivin, 2014, 2013), and this 
source is considered to be one of the most comprehensive data sets involving 




The dependent variable was transit state designation. As the focus of the 
study was on countries operating as transit states, the dependent variable 
identified which countries were more central across transshipment networks, and 
thus, functioned in a structural way as transit states. For the purposes of this 
study, a transit state was operationalized as a country that exhibits in-degree, 
out-degree, and betweenness centrality. Only countries with high scores on all 
three forms of centrality were designated a transit state.  
In-degree and Out-degree Centrality  
The first two metrics were derived from degree centrality, which measured 
how central a node relating to the number of ties they had within a network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). There are two forms of degree centrality, in-degree, 
and out-degree (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Only normalized score values were 
used. For the mathematical equations of in-degree (top equation) and out-degree 
(bottom equation) centrality, refer to Figure 2 (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
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In-degree centrality refers to the number of edges (interactions) in which a 
node is a receiver (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Out-degree centrality refers to 
the number of edges in which the node is the sender (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). An actor is the most central when either it has the most incoming or 






Figure 3.  Degree Centrality Visual.  
 
 
These measures of degree centrality accounted for the number of ties a 
node has while accounting for directionality (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Doing 
so was important because it can alter ones' perception of a structure, potentially 
leading to false inferences about a networks' structure and functionality 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In the study, degree centrality accounted for the 
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number of interactions (drug seizures) experienced by countries within the 
generated network. In-degree centrality accounted for the number of times a 
country received a drug shipment (resulting in a seizure), while out-degree 
centrality accounted for the number of times a country sent a drug shipment. 
Scores obtained from degree centrality metrics are calculated using a valued 
network. Meaning the number of countries involved in a network were accounted 
for, in addition to the reported number of drug seizures taking place on any given 
path.  
Betweenness Centrality 
The third centrality measure was betweenness centrality, which measured 
how central a node is relating to its' positional importance within a network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Betweenness centrality accounts for centrality by 
calculating the number of times a particular actor appeared on any given path to 
connect to another actor within the same network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
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 Betweenness centrality assumes that an actor is centrally based on how 
favored it is in relation to other actors within the network. Actors identified as 
having high betweenness centrality are often referred to as bridges, as they lie 
between and connect with other various actors. According to betweenness 
centrality, an actor is most central in a network when it appears numerous times 






Figure 5.  Betweenness Centrality Visual. 
 
 
For the study, betweenness centrality accounted for the number of times a 
country was positioned on the shortest paths among others who may be sending 
and receiving a drug shipment. This measure of centrality helps to highlight 
countries with the heaviest drug flow within a network. To account for the 
directionality of flow, a directed version betweenness centrality is used.  
27 
 
Why Combine Centrality Metrics? 
Using a combination of centrality metrics identified crucial actors based on 
multiple concepts of centrality. Doing so was useful, as relying on a single 
centrality measure would have led to different inferences about which actor is the 
most important in a network (refer to Table 1). Accounting for three different 
network centrality measures highlights crucial actors in any given network. For 
the purpose of this study, only countries exhibiting all three forms of centrality 
were classed as transit states. This is how the dependent variable was identified. 
Furthermore, the combination of centrality metrics allowed for countries classed 
as transit states to be ranked. Ranking of classed transit states was done by 
summing only normalized values of the centrality scores found (refer to Table 2). 
 
 
Table 1. Why Combine Centrality Metrics? 
Node In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness 
A 100.000 66.667 58.333 
B 33.333 66.667 0 
C 0 33.333 8.333 








Table 2. Combination of Centrality Metrics Allows Ranking 
Node Classed as Transit State? Combined Total Ranking 
A Yes (3) 225.612 1 
B No (2) 100.282 . 
C No (2) 42.189 . 




Prior research supports the use of various centrality measures to assess 
the importance of actors within a network (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et 
al., 2017; Leuprecht, Aulthouse, & Walther, 2016; Bright & Delaney, 2013; Bright, 
Hughes, & Chalmers, 2012; Malm & Bichler, 2011). Centrality depends on 
context, and by combing various centrality measures, actors highlighted are 
representative of more than one element of centrality (Bichler, 2019). This 
allowed for a better-rounded assessment of an actors’ true importance within a 
network in relation to others.  
Country Attributes and Data Sources 
The study examined the degree of influence a country’s migrant 
population, drug price mark-ups, border connectivity, and corruption had (if any) 
on whether a country was central across transshipment networks, thus 
functioning as a transit state (refer to Table 3). Support for these attribute 
variables was available across academic literature to varying degrees. The 
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selected attribute variables represented important factors discussed in the 
literature review observed to influence drug flow across transshipment 
operations. 
Data for the study came from five different sources (see Table 3). Data 
collected allowed us to develop country related attributes (similar to independent 
variables in conventional research methods). Sources include Transparency 
International, the World Bank, the CIA World Fact Book, The United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) division, and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Data provided by selected 
sources are secondary. For descriptive statistics on attribute variables refer to 
Table 4. A brief description and potential limitations of each data source follows. 
 
 
Table 3. Attribute Variables 
Variable Source Factor 
Migrant Population UNDESA Social 
Border Connectivity CIA WF Geographic 
Drug Price Mark-Up UNODC Economic 
Perceived Corruption TI Political 
Control of Corruption World Bank Political 
Note: CIA World Factbook (CIA WF); Transparency International (TI); United Nations Office on 







Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Attribute Variables 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev 
Migrant Population 164 0 87 9.711 14.422 
Border Connectivity 164 0 15 3.430 2.727 
Cocaine Mark-Up 164 0 99.094 50.987 23.339 
Heroin Mark-Up 164 0 95.233 42.272 21.939 
Perceived Corruption 164 9 91 43.570 19.370 





The first variable was migrant population percentage, which reflected the 
known migrant population of a given country. The variable captured which 
percentage of the population in any given country that was foreign born, meaning 
they were not born in the country they resided. High rates of social proximity 
between nations have been argued to serve as pillars for illicit activity to take 
place (Giommoni et al., 2017; Bybee 2012). 
Data for this variable came from the International Migrant Stock (IMS) data 
set. Information for this data was compiled by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA); a division of the United Nations 
responsible for gathering data on population and development of countries 
around the globe. Data collection for the data set was done in conjunction with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Based on official statistics 
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identified by the agency division, information on migrant stocks was available for 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2015, and 2017. 
The greatest limitation to this data set is that annual data is not available 
for every year within the study’s period. The relevance of social proximity is 
identified as a major influencer of drug flow; therefore, IMS estimates provided 
for 2015 will be used for all of the annual networks included in the study. The 
accuracy of totals and stated origins is limited, being that migrant populations 
tend to shy away from official organizations and agencies. Even so, the UNDESA 
is one of the few divisions with the demonstrated ability to track international 
migrant flow.   
Accounting for a country’s migrant population percentage allowed us to 
observe the influence of social proximity. Data for migrant population percentage 
came from the IMS data set. Migrant population percentage was coded as ratio; 
estimates of reported migrant population percentages were coded as exact 
numbers given. IMS data for 2015 served as the migrant population estimate for 
all networks generated and provided the percent of which the population in any 
given country reported to belong to a migrant community. Descriptive statistics of 
this variable are available in Table 4. 
Border Connectivity 
The second variable was border connectivity, which captured how 
connected a country is based on the number of borders it shares with other 
countries. Boivin (2014) identified how countries with numerous shared borders 
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are able to generate more profit at a lower risk in comparison to those with fewer 
borders. Data is taken from the CIA World Factbook to generate a country-to-
country attribute file. The CIA World Factbook is a source produced by the 
Central Intelligence Agency that provides information on countries around the 
world. Their land boundaries publication accounts for the number of borders a 
given country shares with others. 
Accounting for border connectivity allowed us to observe the influence of 
geographic proximity. Border connectivity was coded as ratio, reflecting the exact 
number of shared borders a country had. To generate a score for each country, 
the number of borders it shared with other countries was included in the study. 
Descriptive statistics of this variable are available in Table 4. 
Drug Price Mark-Up 
The third variable was drug price mark-ups, which captured the rate at 
which a drug bought at the wholesale value was marked up when selling at the 
retail value. Studies have found that countries in which drug price mark-ups were 
relatively low are indicative of a high-profit margin for individuals involved in the 
transshipment of illicit drugs (Giommoni et al., 2017; Boivin, 2014; Reuter, 2014; 
Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). Accounting for drug price mark-ups allowed us to 
explore economic factors that relate to profit maximization. Data was taken from 
the Retail and Wholesale Drug prices data set to create an attribute file. The 
UNODC compiles information for this data set as well, which contains information 
on the sale value of illicit drugs around the world. Information on illicit drug prices 
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were available for 2013 to 2016. The data set identified the rate at which drugs 
went in different countries and provided a low to max range at which illicit drugs 
sell based on the unit, along with the average price that a specific illicit drug sold 
for in each nation. Data obtained on drug price mark-ups are coded as ratio, 
allowing us to capture the true value and to generate accurate mark-up 
percentages. 
The given dollar amount may not truly reflect the worth of a product in the 
country it is being sold in. Meaning, a product can be worth more or less in one 
nation, but because of the currency exchange rate during any given year, its 
value may be different in the United States. Nonetheless, approximations are 
useful as the monetary gain is what drives the illicit drug market. Provided dollar 
amounts are standardized and adjusted for inflation using the United States 
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistic Customer Price Index Inflation 
Calculator prior to calculating wholesale to retail price mark-up percentage. To 
calculate the drug price mark-up percentage, the retail cost is deducted from the 
wholesale price and then divided the sum by the retail cost. This provided us with 
the whole to retail mark-up percentage. Descriptive statistics of this variable are 
available in Table 4. 
Corruption 
Both the level of perceived corruption and the level of control of corruption 
in a given country are used to measure corruption. It has been observed that 
individuals involved in drug trafficking tend to operate where the risk is lower 
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(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2016; Boivin, 2014; De Danieli, 2014; 
Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; Wyler & Cook, 
2011; Emmers, 2003; Layne et al., 2001; Sands, 2007; Swanstorm, 2007). By 
accounting for corruption, political factors relating to risk can be explored.  
Data was taken from the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reports 
to create the perceived corruption attribute file. Transparency International, an 
organization that captures information on the perceived level of corruption within 
a country produces the reports. The annual CPI reports provide a corruption 
score based on how corrupt the public sector of a given country is believed to be. 
Data for these particular reports were available from 1995 to 2018. Reports 
include a ranking of the nations included and the number of sources that used to 
generate individual estimates. Descriptive statistics of this variable are available 
in Table 4. Not every country had data listed for them. To account for missing 
data, the median CPI value is used for countries where data was not available. 
Additionally, calculated scores stem from relatively small sample sizes. Caution 
was taken when interpreting scores provided by the CPI.  
Data was also taken from The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project to create the control of corruption attribute file. The World Bank, a 
financial institution that funds projects in developing countries around the globe 
intending to ending poverty, also funds the WGI project. The WGI report includes 
data on six aspects believed to influence the ability of a government to function 
effectively. Of interest is the Control of Corruption aspect (CCI). The CCI 
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provided information on the perceived level of corruption based on the believed 
extent that public power is used as a means for personal gain. The WGI project 
captured data from 1996 to 2017 and provides estimates for whether a country 
has weak or strong governance, signaling whether a nations’ government is or is 
not influenced by corruption. Descriptive statistics of this variable are available in 
Table 4. 
Scores provided by CCI will be interpreted with caution as well. Like the 
CPI reports, CCI data is limited, and scores stem small samples. For countries 
where data was not available, the median CCI value was used. Both measures 
for corruption were interpreted together to produce greater results. Corruption 
was coded as both an interval and ratio. Data obtained from CPI were coded as 
interval, scores of perceived corruption range from zero (very clean) to 100 
(highly corrupt). Data obtained from CCI were coded as interval, scores of control 
of corruption range from zero (high control) to nine (low control).  
Analytic Plan 
Network visuals were created using NetDraw and descriptive statistics 
calculated with UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Centrality 
metrics (in-degree centrality, out-degree centrality, and betweenness centrality) 
were run for each network individually using UCINET as well. Doing so allowed 
for data within each network to be evaluated independently of one another. The 
combination of centrality metrics allowed for the dependent variables to be 
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identified. In addition to identifying the top ten percent of countries classed as 
transit states across the three networks. 
 Next, variables were assessed for multicollinearity. The concept of 
multicollinearity refers to when a set of incorporated attribute variables in a given 
study are highly correlated with one another (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). This is 
problematic as it affects the results and their potential significance (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). Upon running a correlation statistic on the set of attribute 
variables, it was determined that they were not highly correlated. From there, I 
moved on to a multivariate regression analysis. 
A Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) was used to assess the extent 
that corruption, border connectivity, migrant population, and drug price mark-up 
in a given country influences transit state designation. QAP is a two-part process 
in which an initial regression is run, followed by multiple regression permutations 
to account for standard error (Hanneman & Riddle, 2011). A QAP is ideal for this 
study as the model recognizes that the actors involved in the network are not 
necessarily independent from one another (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). By 
incorporating a multiple regression analysis, all five attribute variables are 
assessed in relation to the dependent variable at the same time. This allowed the 
value of how much an independent variable impacts the dependent variable to be 






Aggregated Drug Seizure Network  
The Aggregated Drug Seizure (ADS) Network consisted of 164 countries. 
While more than 100 different types of drugs were seized, approximately 70% of 
seizures captured in the ADS network involved cocaine or heroin derivatives. 
Network characteristics are provided in Table 5. The network included 696 
unique ties, reflecting the number of relationships between countries reported 
within the observed period. Important to note that reflexive ties are not accounted 
for when observing unique ties. The observed ties accounted for directionality 
(reflected in the arrows), indicating whether a country was on the sending or 
receiving end. With an observed density of 73%, more than half of the countries 
involved in the ADS Network were connected to one another, indicating 
moderate cohesion (see Table 6). Metrics describing network size and structural 
properties were calculated with UCINET 61.  
                                                
1 Using UCINET and NetDraw characteristics pertaining to a networks size and 
their structural properties were calculated. For information pertaining to a 
networks size, refer to Table 5. For information pertaining to a networks 
structure, refer to Table 6. Size and structural information is provided for all three 
networks to better understand them. Using UCINET and NetDraw characteristics 
pertaining to a networks size and their structural properties were calculated. For 
information pertaining to a networks size, refer to Table 5. For information 
pertaining to a networks structure, refer to Table 5. Size and structural 
information is provided for all three networks to better understand them. 
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Table 5. Characteristics of Networks Generated 
Network Type Total Ties 
Unique 




Seizure Network 26732 696 164 1 100% 
Cocaine Drug 
Seizure Network 10920 291 105 1 100% 
Heroin Drug 




Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Networks Generated 
Network Type Density Average Out/In Degree (SD) 
Normed Average 




Seizure Network  73.5% 
119 (379.03) / 
119 (687.34) 





Seizure Network  51.1% 
53 (217.20) / 
53 (307.94) 





Seizure Network 11.2% 
9.73 (28.16) / 
9.73 (24.69) 







The aggregated network is illustrated in Figure 6. Each node (circular 
figures) in the network represent countries involved in the transshipment of illicit 
drugs, and the ties linking them represent a relationship between any two 
countries. All colored nodes represent countries classed as transit states; those 









 The Cocaine Drug Seizure (CDS) Network consisted of 104 countries and 
made up 41% of all reported drug seizures during the selected time frame. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5 above, and the network is illustrated 
in Figure 7. All colored nodes represent countries classed as transit states; those 
in yellow represent countries identified to operate in the top ten percent. The 
network captures 291 unique ties, reflecting the number of observed 
relationships between countries included. With an observed density of 51%, 
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more than half of the countries involved in the CDS Network were connected to 
one another, indicating weak to moderate cohesion (see Table 6). Important to 








 The Heroin Drug Seizure (HDS) Network consisted of 87 countries, with 
unique 151 ties spread amongst three components. The HDS network made up 
29% of all reported drug seizures during the selected time frame. Important to 
note that reflexive ties are not accounted for when observing unique ties. All 
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colored nodes represent countries classed as transit states; those in yellow 
represent countries identified to operate in the top ten percent. Descriptive 
statistics are provided in Table 5 above, and the network is illustrated in Figure 8. 
Component one, the smallest, consisted of two countries, capturing a single tie. 
Component two, the second smallest, consisted of nine countries, capturing eight 
ties. While component three, the largest and main component, consisted of 76 
countries and captures unique 142 ties. With an observed density of 11%, only a 
few countries involved in the HDS Network were connected to one another, 






Figure 8. Heroin Drug Seizure Network 2013-2016  
 
Combination of Social Network Analysis (SNA) Metrics 
 The combination of SNA metrics led to the designation of 62 countries as 
transit states within the ADS network, 27 countries in the CDS network, and 25 
countries in the HDS network (refer to Table 7). Spain headed the AGS and CDS 
networks, falling in second in the HDS network. Pakistan, which is classed as a 
transit state the AGS top ten percent and in the overall CDS network, headed the 
HDS network. Austria, India, Italy, and Spain were observed in the top ten 
percent as transit states across all three networks. For the ranking of the top ten 
43 
 
percent countries classed as transit states refer to Table 8. Nine countries were 
observed to overlap across the three networks as transit states (countries 
italicized in Table 7). 
 
 


































































Trinidad & Tobago 



























































United Arab Emirates 
Uzbekistan 
 




Table 8. Top Ten Percent Transit States by Network Type 









































Note: Italicized countries are present as transit states operating in the top ten 





 Prior to running a Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) a diagnostic 
check was conducted on independent attribute variables to identify if any were 
correlate highly with one another. No variables were found to highly correlate 




















1 -0.279 0.079 -0.280 -0.422 
Border 
Connectivity 
-0.279 1 -0.143 0.228 0.392 
Drug Price Mark-
Up 
0.079 -0.143 1 -0.049 -0.056 
Perceived 
Corruption 
-0.280 0.228 -0.049 1 0.544 
Control of 
Corruption 
-0.422 0.392 -0.056 0.544 1 
 
 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) 
Table 10 reports the results of three QAP regression models. The first 
model focuses on the aggregated drug network, the second model focuses on 
the cocaine drug network, and the third model focuses on the heroin drug 
network. Regression coefficients computed were based on 10,000 permutations 
reflecting potential outcomes.  
Model fit varied. The explanatory variables accounted for 24% of variance 
in the dependent variable when looking at the ADS network. That percentage 
dropped to 20% when looking at the HDS network, and then to 12% when 
looking at the CDS network. Despite the low r squared coefficients, significant 
results were obtained. QAP outputs identified three of the five variables 
significant as to varying degrees (refer to Table 10).  
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Migrant Population Percentage 
 A negative relationship is observed between a country’s migrant 
population percentage and their likeliness of being classed as a transit state 
(refer to Table 10). This means that nations with a higher percentage of migrants 
were less likely to be among the most central transit nations in the drug 
distribution network, as revealed by seizure data. Failing to achieve significance 
at a p<.05 level, it was not possible to reject a null hypothesis.  
Notably, the relationship approached significance for the cocaine network, 
suggesting that countries involved in the transshipment of cocaine do not have 
large migrant populations. When observing the heroin network, the relationship 





















Aggregated Network Cocaine Network Heroin Network 




-0.150 0.004 0.016 -0.159 0.003 0.012 --- --- --- 
Heroin Price 
Mark-up % -0.101 0.004 0.112 --- --- --- -0.202 0.003 0.001 
Perception of 
Corruption 0.390 0.008 0.000 0.213 0.007 0.069 0.338 0.006 0.005 
Control of 
Corruption 0.266 0.079 0.028 0.061 0.071 0.645 0.194 0.066 0.121 
Border 
Connectivity 0.321 0.028 0.000 0.238 0.025 0.001 0.360 0.023 0.000 
Migrant 




         
N 235 --- --- 235 --- --- 235 --- --- 
Adj. R-
square 0.241 --- --- 0.122 --- --- 0.209 --- --- 
F  13.377 --- --- 7.502 --- --- 13.350 --- --- 






Drug Price Mark-up 
 A negative relationship is observed between a country’s drug price 
markup and their likeliness of being classed as a transit state (refer to Table 10). 
Based on the results, it can be inferred that countries with lower drug price mark-
ups are likely to be central to the transshipment of illicit drugs. When observing 
the ADS network, only the relationship between cocaine drug mark-ups achieved 
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significance. However, the relationship achieved significance at a p<.05 for the 
CDS and HDS networks. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.  
Corruption 
 Two modes of corruption were used to assess corruption is a marker of 
countries embedded in the transshipment of illicit drugs—the level of perceived 
corruption and the level of perceived control of corruption. When assessing 
corruption through the level of perceived corruption in a country, a positive 
relationship is observed (refer to Table 10). Based on this measure, it appears 
that countries exhibiting higher levels of corruption are likely to be central to the 
transshipment of illicit drugs. A positive relationship is also found when assessing 
corruption through the level of perceived control of corruption in a country (refer 
to Table 10). By this measure, countries identified as having higher levels of 
corruption, due to their lower levels of perceived control of corruption, are likely to 
be central to the transshipment of illicit drugs.  
The relationship between both measures achieved significance at a p<.05 
in the ADS network. Thus, leading us to reject the null hypothesis. Corruption 
appears to have limited influence with potential transit states in the CDS network, 
as both measures failed to achieve significance. When looking at the HDS 





 A positive relationship is found between a country’s border connectivity 
and their likelihood of being classed as a transit state (refer to Table 10). Based 
on the results, it can be inferred that countries embedded in the transshipment of 
illicit drugs are marked as having high border connectivity. Meaning the more 
borders a country shares with other countries, the likelier it is to operate as a 
transit state.  
This relationship achieved significance at a p<.05 across all three 
networks and is the only variable with such an effect. As a result, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Of the five attributes, border connectivity is found to have 
the most influence on whether a country is to operate as a transit state, making it 
























 This study investigated the importance social, geographic, economic, and 
political factors that have the potential of serving as predictive markers for 
identifying transits states already embedded in international drug trafficking. In 
analyzing drug seizure data reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) this study mapped and compared countries central to the 
transshipment of illicit drugs generally, and more specifically, heroin and cocaine. 
Doing so allowed a test of five possible facilitating factors—migrant population in 
a country, border connectivity, drug price mark-ups, and corruption—that might 
account for countries centrally positioned within illicit trade networks. While the 
explanatory variables did not account for all the variance in the dependent 
variable, it did account for a significant amount. The findings confirm that transit 
states do share similar characteristics—even if to varying degrees, which can 
also serve as identifying markers.  
Main Findings 
 This study posed six hypotheses predicting how a country’s migrant 
population, their border connectivity, drug price mark-up observed, and perceived 
level of corruption would be associated with being positioned as a central actor 
for the transshipment of illicit drugs. Mapping drug seizures reported to the 
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United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime between 2013 and 2016 resulted in the 
following conclusions. 
Hypothesis 1 
 Corruption was present in countries operating as transit states and served 
as a significant predictive marker for identifying them. Thus, confirming the first 
hypothesis—the higher the degree of corruption in a country, the more likely it is 
to be a transit state. This finding is consistent with prior research focusing on the 
European region and South East Asia (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Emmers, 2003).  
Prior research has also observed the role of corruption in countries like El 
Salvador, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, where its presence led to the targeting of 
these countries to function as transit states (Miraglia et al., 2012; Layne et al., 
2001). Countries exhibiting higher levels of corruption offer drug traffickers more 
security at a lesser price, contributing to why such countries are sought for the 
transshipment of illicit narcotics (Caulkins, 2009).   
Hypothesis 2 
High border connectivity was present in countries operating as transit 
states and served as a significant predictive marker for identifying them. 
Therefore, countries with numerous shared borders are more likely to function as 
transit states embedded in international drug trafficking. This finding confirms the 
second hypothesis—transit states have more border connectivity in comparison 
to countries that are not transit states. 
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Academic literature supports the influence of high border connectivity, 
noting that it preserves costs associated with risks and transportation (Boivin, 
2014). The value of a country’s high border connectivity is observed in Turkey, 
where its vast region enables individuals to trek a great distance without running 
into institutional controls (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012).  
Hypothesis 3 
The migrant population percentage did not influence whether a country 
operated as a transit state. Therefore, the influence of migrant population 
percentage was not observed as a significant identifying marker for transit states 
embedded in international drug trafficking. While it was hypothesized that— 
transit states have larger migrant populations in comparison to countries that are 
not transit states—a determination was not possible due to lack of significant 
results. 
Despite this finding, a study done by Sands (2007) found that large 
migrant populations in a given country do facilitate the presence of illicit 
organized crime, particularly Spain. The presence of ethnic enclaves and 
communities across various countries are noted to work as facilitating factors, 
being that they reduce risk itself and price associated to risk (Berlusconi et al., 
2017; Giommoni et al., 2017; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; 
Caulkins, 2009). Lack of support for the migrant population percentage in the 
study may be due to the variable simply focusing on the size of a community 




Drug price mark-ups influence whether a country is to operate as a transit 
state. The selling price of an illicit product represents the ease at which it moves 
across any given network (Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). The study observed drug 
price mark-ups as a significant identifying marker for identifying transit states. 
The finding confirms the fourth hypothesis—transit states have lower mark-up 
percentages in comparison to countries that are not transit states. 
The higher the risk, the higher the drug price mark-up to account for the 
price of risk involved, reducing the economic return for those involved (Boivin, 
2013, 2014). These results suggest that there is less of a drug price mark-up in 
countries operating as transit states, which may suggest that the risk of seizure 
or apprehension is minimal (Boivin, 2014). The influence of drug price mark-up 
cost, however, is not relevant to transit states involved in the transshipment of 
heroin products. Giommoni et al. (2017) note how, when observing the 
transshipment of heroin, various countries are involved, increasing the size of the 
heroin drug market and reducing the effect of the cost associated. It is plausible 
that other factors relating to risk influence of drug price mark-ups, such as market 
size or consumption rates in a given country. 
Hypothesis 5 
 While corruption serves as a significant marker for identifying transit states 
embedded in international trafficking, it is not the most important. Border 
connectivity, unlike corruption, proved significant across all three networks 
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generated, making it the most significant marker, and corruption the second. 
While it was hypothesized that corruption would be the most significant 
identifying marker of transit state designation, the study failed to confirm the 
hypothesis. 
While academic literature discusses and identifies corruption more widely 
as a facilitating factor (Maftei, 2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011), the present study 
found the impact of border connectivity to be more pronounced. The data 
revealed that the more shared borders a country had, the likelier is to act as a 
transit state, in relation to the level of corruption taking place within that country’s 
borders. This makes sense, as countries with higher border connectivity are 
likelier to suffer from weak or inefficient border control, making them the ideal 
transit state as they literally bridge multiple countries to one another. A country 
with numerous borders is not limited by the will of single individual, and offers 
more than one entry and exit point. A corrupt country offers an illicit drug a way 
in, but not necessarily a way out, while a country with numerous borders offers 
both advantages.  
Hypothesis 6 
Different countries were found to operate as transit states across each of 
the drug networks generated. Great differences were noted in the top ten percent 
of countries operating as transit states. While it was hypothesized that—the 
same countries will be positioned as transit states within the illicit drug 
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transshipment network irrespective of illicit drug examined (e.g., heroin, 
cocaine)—the study was unable to confirm the hypothesis. 
In reducing the number of drug types captured in a network, the number of 
potential countries involved was also reduced. Differences in countries identified 
as transit states can be attributed to differences in the significance of the 
selected attribute variables across each of the networks. The majority of cocaine-
based products are produced in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia—all of which are in 
South America (Global Financial Integrity, 2017). Roughly 50 countries are 
involved in the production of opium-based products, with Afghanistan producing 
roughly 70% of the available product (Global Financial Integrity, 2017). Unlike 
cocaine, opium is produced in numerous regions (the Middle East, Asia, Latin 
America), involving more countries in the transshipment of the product. 
Implications 
The transshipment of illicit drugs, despite being a small part of the drug-
market commodity chain, is an important aspect deserving of attention. By 
observing the avenues in which illicit drugs are trafficked, it is possible to 
understand why those particular avenues are selected and how to disrupt drug 
flow. This study not only reveals how certain characteristics heighten the 
likeliness of a given country to function as a transit state but also sheds light on 
the lack of efficient reporting practices that hinder these types of observations.   
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In using data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime it was 
revealed how certain countries appear to report more than others. It is possible 
that countries like Spain are identified as crucial actors in transshipment 
operations due to their high reporting. However, Spain’s level of reporting, and 
the lack of reporting by other major suspected transit states may heighten the 
role played by Spain and other nations with strong reporting practices. 
Incentivizing or mounting collaborative efforts to strengthen border screening 
capabilities would improve the identification of illicit drug shipments. In addition, 
administrative support may be needed to enhance the capacity to accurately 
report the results of drug interdiction efforts. 
High border connectivity, high perceived corruption, and low drug price 
mark-ups are all significant markers for identifying countries that are operating as 
central transit states, or with the potential to do so. Of the three, border 
connectivity is the most influential identifying marker. Countries with high border 
connectivity often have more traffic and are less able to provide adequate 
resources to all their border entry points, inadvertently making it easier to 
smuggle illicit goods (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Ekici & Ozbay, 2013; Toktas & 
Selimoglu, 2012). Therefore, efforts aimed to aid countries as it relates to them 
operating as transit states should focus on strengthening controls at their 
borders. Doing so will minimize both entry and exit points provided by any given 
country, increasing risk and the price of risk for those involved in the 
transshipment of any type of illicit good. 
57 
 
 Furthermore, depending on the type of drug product being trafficked, 
different countries operate as key players and transit states. However, there were 
a few countries present across the three networks. Of those in the top ten 
percent, the study observed three countries operating as transit states, 
regardless of the drug type involved—Spain, Austria, and Italy. Efforts to curb 
participation in the transshipment of illicit drugs would benefit from zoning in on 
countries, such as these, and identifying why involvement for some countries is 
not limited by drug type.   
Limitations 
 It is important to acknowledge that several limitations arose throughout the 
course of this study. Some of which could influence conclusions made. Of note, 
the primary data source used for this study contains information that is provided 
on a voluntary basis. Agencies reporting seizures do so because they want to, 
and information they report is not fact-checked. As a result, certain countries 
were more represented in the drug seizure networks since they were avid 
reporters.   
Furthermore, a country in which a seizure took place is only present in 
networks generated if the sending country is known. Countries, like Afghanistan, 
despite a seizure having taken place there are not present in the study, as all the 
seizure data linked to Afghanistan did not provide information on who sent a 
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shipment. It is important to acknowledge that results of this study may not be 
truly representative, being that some major transit states did not appear.  
Lastly, another limitation pertains to why significance was not achieved for 
the migrant population variable. While it was the goal to obtain more information 
on the origin of migrant populations in any given country, data available was 
severely limited. Therefore, the variable of migrant population as coded in this 
study captured more the size of a migrant population than its strength of 
attachment to any given country. 
Future Research 
Future research relating to countries involved in the transshipment of illicit 
drugs can benefit from the following suggestions. First, future research will 
benefit by incorporating various sources into their data to map international drug 
flow. Network generation based on data derived from a single source runs a risk 
that the network is not comprehensive. Thus, affecting the identification of key 
actors and structural properties. Many studies have relied on the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. However, the data sets available are limiting, as the 
information provided is incomplete. The integration of various sources to 
generate and map a network of international drug flow would enable a wider 
scope of analysis to take place, as more countries would be included.  
Additionally, future research will benefit from incorporating different 
variables from the ones applied in this study. While it is known that transit states 
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share similar characteristics, there is still debate to the degree that some of them 
influence their participation across transshipment operations. Future research 
would benefit from better operationalizing variables under observation, and by 
controlling for variables that relate to political, social, geographic, and economic 
factors. Such as, controlling for the influence of port flow and openness, while 
assessing border connectivity. Perhaps even controlling for the rate at which 
money is laundered in a country while assessing economic driving factors and 
even corruption.  
Even by assessing variables already observed in the literature but from 
different angles would benefit future research. This study observed migrant 
population by overall size rather than strength. Future research will benefit by 
assessing the origin of migrant flow and seeing how that impacts drug flow. 
Furthermore, this study focused on overall border connectivity. However, future 
research will benefit by assessing the quality of borders shared between 
countries—taking into account the costal lines of a country and how that may 
impact a country’s role as a transit state.  
Future research will also benefit from evaluating drug flow by observing 
the flow of different drug types, not just cocaine and heroin. This study revealed 
how significance of variables varies by drug type, therefore, future research 
should look how the influences of certain variables vary by drug type under 
observation and why. It is likely that by observing the influence of certain 
variables across distinct drug type networks (i.e. hallucinogens, 
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methamphetamines, cannabis) researchers will gain a better understanding of 
which factors are most important. Expanding focus can potentially lead to the 
identification of new factors never even considered in the literature. 
It is important to note that while this study looked at variables influenced 
by risk and the cost of risk in any given country, it did not actually measure risk. 
Future studies will benefit from accounting for the level of risk, as it may help to 
better understand attribute variables and their influence. Risk can be accounted 
for the rate at which seizures take place in a given country, the number of drug 
busts operations, or the rate of conviction rates relating to drug trafficking 
charges.  
Lastly, future research will also benefit by incorporating a longitudinal 
design into their studies. Literature pertaining to drug flow and international drug 
trafficking is limited to static models. Data derived from longitudinal studies can 
lead to more accurate methods to combat international drug trafficking as it 
identifies potential trends and patterns. Furthermore, in observing drug flow 
networks annually over a prolonged period enables researchers to attach 
changes in a network to external changes occurring in the year of observation, 
like policy changes or major drug busts. Overall, observing international drug 
trafficking as a whole from a longitudinal perspective poses the ability to identify 
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